The Making of the Attorney General: John Mitchell and the Crimes of Watergate Reconsidered by Caplan, Gerald
University of the Pacific
Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship
2010
The Making of the Attorney General: John Mitchell
and the Crimes of Watergate Reconsidered
Gerald Caplan
Pacific McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Legal Biography Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
41 McGeorge L. Rev. 311
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Commons
Book Review Essay
The Making of the Attorney General: John Mitchell and the
Crimes of Watergate Reconsidered
Gerald Caplan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after I resigned my position as General Counsel of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department in 1971, I was startled to receive a
two-page letter from Attorney General John Mitchell. I was not a Department of
Justice employee, and Mitchell's acquaintance with me was largely second-hand.
The contents were surprising. Mitchell generously lauded my rather modest role
"in developing an effective and professional law enforcement program for the
District of Columbia." Beyond this, he added, "Your thoughtful suggestions have
been of considerable help to me and my colleagues at the Department of Justice."
The salutation was, "Dear Jerry," and the signature, "John." I was elated. I
framed the letter and hung it in my office. There it remained for several years
until, following Mitchell's felony convictions, it engendered double-entendres
and became the butt of humor.
Mitchell's accolades were not entirely formulaic. The Nixon Administration
had poured resources into the criminal justice system in the District of
Columbia.' The Police Department was better trained, better equipped, greatly
enlarged, and supported by a newly created General Counsel's Office, which I
headed. Its creation implemented a best practices recommendation of President
Lyndon Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
aimed at making enforcement more law-conforming and effective.2 But it was not
only the police who benefited from administration largesse.3 The entire criminal
justice system of the District, including the bail agency, the public defender, and
the corrections department, were the beneficiaries of generous funding. President
Nixon saw the District of Columbia as an ideal setting to implement his
campaign promises to reduce crime.4 Thus, the Administration trumpeted the
increase in sworn police personnel and its get-tough legislative proposals, such as
preventive detention of dangerous suspects and no-knock entries for serving
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. For their helpful suggestions, I
am indebted to my colleagues, Professors Brian Landsberg and Michael Vitiello, and to Professor G. Robert
Blakey, Judge Geoffrey Alprin, and Jerry V. Wilson.
1. See JAMES ROSEN, THE STRONG MAN 72-73 (2008).
2. See Gerald Caplan, Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime, 1964-1968, 1973 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583,
591 (1973) (providing background information about the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice).
3. See id. at 616 (outlining the 1968 budgetary distribution).
4. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 72.
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drug-related search warrants, and avoided taking credit for the substantial
improvements to the criminal justice system as a whole, which it fostered.'
The first time I met Mitchell was in the midst of an anti-war demonstration at
the Department of Justice on November 13, 1969. I was charged with bringing a
written message to Mitchell at his office in the Department of Justice. A radical
group, the "Yippies, ... had secured a three-hour picketing permit to protest the
trial of their leader, Abbie Hoffman, and other members of the Chicago Eight.
' 6
Several thousand unruly protesters surrounded the Department, chanting "One,
two, stop the trial! Three, four, stop the war! Five, six, kill the pigs! Seven, eight,
smash the state!"7 We were concerned. Should the protestors turn violent or
attempt a forcible entry, the police would be unable to turn them away and many
injuries would result. Moreover, there was reason to fear that violence would
break out elsewhere in the District. A bridge might be blown up; there might be
looting; some marchers might be armed.
When I arrived, I was escorted into the Attorney General's conference room.
Mitchell was sitting calmly at the head of a very long table with about twenty
high-level agency representatives in attendance. John Ehrlichman, the President's
Chief Domestic Advisor, sat to his immediate left. Mitchell paused the meeting
when I entered the room, looked my way, smiled, asked my name, and thanked
me for my help. This show of courtesy during a time of great stress, I was to
learn, was, like his letter to an outgoing employee, typical of the warmth and
consideration that Mitchell extended to his colleagues and subordinates. For me,
a young attorney working in the midst of disorder and danger, the Attorney
General's soft-spoken, pipe-in-hand, imperturbable manner was reassuring.
Things were under control; we in law enforcement were doing the right thing.
And, in fact, this was so. The demonstrations in the city were largely
peaceful. The District of Columbia Police, supported by other enforcement
agencies and the military, acted with remarkable restraint. Moreover, the
demonstration leadership, in particular their attorney, were forthcoming about
when, where, and what they intended to do.8 The only significant unexpected
occurrence was the intentional smashing of numerous windows and glass doors
by some demonstrators.9 Several hundred were arrested without difficulty. There
were no charges of police abuse or excessive force, though there were justified
complaints about the excessive use of tear gas.'0 The system worked the way it
was supposed to work, which was no small achievement given the stress it was
under and the potential for calamity."
5. Id. at 72-73.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See ROSEN, supra note 1, at 94.
10. Id. at 94-95 (describing the specific use and general effects of tear gas).
11. Memorandum from Jerry V. Wilson, Former Police Chief, D.C. Police Dep't, to author (Mar. 19,
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Now, nearly forty years after this demonstration and nearly as many since the
foiled break-in at the luxury Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party, a
full-length, birth-to-grave biography of John Mitchell, entitled, The Strong Man,
has been published.12 It is, as I had hoped, revisionist, offering a more generous
evaluation of the man and his service in office during those unsettling times
when the Vietnam War and anti-war protests divided the nation and tested our
democratic ways. Nonetheless, it was a painful read, chronicling Mitchell's
downfall and the lawlessness of the President and his aides.
But for Watergate, Mitchell's legacy would likely be little more than a
footnote to the Nixon Presidency. He would be remembered for his skill as a
campaign manager in guiding Nixon through two remarkably successful
campaigns for the presidency in 1968 and 1972 and for being the Attorney
General who reset the scales of justice to favor law enforcement at a time when it
was needed. 13 Yet Mitchell's entire distinguished career, from Wall Street to
Washington, has been reduced to but a prelude to scandal. 14 Being the highest-
ranking federal official convicted of a felony is his enduring commemoration.
Although Mitchell suffered greatly-imprisoned, disbarred, disgraced, and
ostracized-he is not remembered sympathetically. 5 The triggering events of his
downfall were largely of his own making. They were just deserts, not tragedy.
James Rosen's account of Mitchell's life is informed by documents that were
unavailable to other chroniclers of the Nixon years or overlooked in the huge
cache of official records, such as the Nixon White House tapes.' 6 Much of it is
favorable to Mitchell or can reasonably be so interpreted. Some of it is eye-
opening, even to those, like me, who followed the breaking events of the day.
Most readers will find Rosen's effort to prove Mitchell innocent of the most
serious allegation made against him-that he approved the break-in at
Watergate-persuasive. Rosen's stated intent in writing the biography is to set
2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). "I too was displeased by the overuse of tear gas, then and
frequently thereafter. I also was irritated by the small number of arrests." Id. at 5 n. 10.
12. ROSEN, supra note 1.
13. Id. at xv.
14. See generally id. at 14-114 (detailing the career of John Mitchell).
15. Id. at 440-98 (describing Mitchell's later years).
16. Rosen's research is remarkable for its vigor, thoroughness, and, most notably, its yield of fresh and
relevant information. Rosen justifiably claims that his account is "not your father's Watergate." Id. at xxiv.
Surprisingly, he managed to scour "whole archives of contemporaneous documents-[that] had never before
been mined, or even requested for inspection, by the armies of earlier scholars. These included the internal files
of the staff lawyers ... in closed-door executive session." Id. at xxiii. In addition to digesting the voluminous
secondary literature on Nixon, Watergate, and the convulsive events of the 1960s and the daily-deadline
reportage of the Washington press corps, Rosen aggressively employed the Freedom of Information Act to
"pr[y] loose hundreds of thousands of previously undisclosed documents and tape recordings." Id. Rosen may
be the first scholar to make "the long march, on microfiche, through every sheet of Haldeman's and
Ehrlichman's 200,000 pages of yellow-pad notes from their meetings with President Nixon." Id.
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the record straight; 7 in so doing, he brings to light unsettling evidence of
Mitchell's poor judgment, misbehavior, and personal flaws. But his story of
Mitchell's life, viewed as a whole, is nonetheless an advocate's account. Rosen's
finger is on the scale, interpreting facts and drawing inferences unduly favorable
to Mitchell. This ordinarily would be a basis for objection, but in context, it does
not detract from the work. One can read the book, disagree with its conclusions,
and still come away with a rich, enlarged understanding, because Rosen
ordinarily positions his reader to second-guess him. Rosen is not the first
biographer to develop a fondness for his subject, and Mitchell, however stone-
faced and forbidding in public, was, in person, likeable (and indeed well-liked),
good-humored, caring, and thoughtful.
Mitchell, by all accounts, was a private person, unforthcoming and
unresponsive in situations that called for explanation. His brother said: "'I don't
think anyone really knew him. He lived within himself very much."" 8 Rosen
finds Mitchell "notorious for his inscrutability,"'9 and Nixon Presidential Aide
John Ehrlichman described him as "'taciturn, aloof, a sort of Wall Street Gary
Cooper.' 20 Although every biographer observes discordant features in his
subject-tendencies and predispositions that pull him in different ways-
Mitchell's self-containment poses a special challenge, that of determining which
elements are representative and configuring them in some plausible harmony.
And, as with biographical production generally, there are offstage happenings of
which the author knows nothing, and which, if known, would promote a more
accurate depiction. My account of Mitchell's life differs in important particulars
from that of Rosen. We share the same purpose, making sense of the heart-
rending failure of an otherwise decent man to discharge the duties of his office.
My analysis has led me, regrettably, to hold Mitchell more accountable.
What President Gerald Ford, Nixon's successor in office, referred to as "our
long national nightmare' 21 "began, as a matter of public record, in the early
morning hours of June 17, 1972. ''22 District of Colmbia Police Officers arrested
five men inside the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the
Watergate office complex.2 ' These were not ordinary burglars. They were dressed
in "business suits and rubber gloves, carrying cameras[] [and] sophisticated
17. National Review Online, Interview: The Book on Mitchell, June 27, 2008, http://article.national
review.com/?q=ZjgyNDQ3OWNiMmMOOWNmZGJkYzBiNjY3NzRIYWMIMTA (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
18. ROSEN, supra note 1, at I.
19. Id. at xxiv.
20. Id. at 43 (quoting JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 75 (1982)).
Ehrlichman also remarked, "'[Later] I began to see that he wasn't as gruff and remote as he appeared.... [H]e
was withdrawn and quiet, but hardly forbidding."' Id.
21. Id. at xxv.
22. Id. at xvi.
23. Id.
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electronics equipment. 24 Police quickly linked them to Howard Hunt, a former
CIA officer then on the White House payroll, and to Gordon Liddy, a former
White House employee, then the General Counsel to the Committee for the Re-
Election of the President (CRP), which Mitchell chaired.25 Prior to trial, at the
instigation of John Dean (then-acting counsel to the President and previously
Mitchell's subordinate at the Department of Justice), the five began receiving
26secret payments: hush money to buy their silence as part of a cover-up attempt .
Dean was aided by Jeb Magruder, Mitchell's deputy at the CRP.2 7
The cover-up struggled along for several months, then crashed suddenly
when one of the burglars, James McCord, "broke ranks" with his co-defendants
(all of whom had pleaded guilty) and wrote the trial judge, John Sirica, a tell-all
28letter, which he read in open court. McCord's disclosures implicated Dean and
Magruder and prompted them to negotiate favorable plea bargains in exchange
for their testimonies. 29 Their testimonies led to indictments for perjury and
obstruction of justice against the President's ranking aides, including White
House Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman; Chief Domestic Advisor, John
Ehrlichman; and former Attorney General, John Mitchell.30 In the summer of
1973, investigators discovered that "Nixon had surreptitiously recorded virtually
all his meetings and phone calls, from February 1971 onward."'" The tapes
revealed Nixon's early awareness and sporadic participation in the cover-up and
induced his resignation in August 1974.32 A month later, President Ford pardoned
him "for all crimes he committed 'or may have committed' while in office.,
3
Subsequently, investigators discovered that Hunt and Liddy had engineered
an earlier break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in an
unsuccessful attempt to determine whether it was Ellsberg who leaked classified
documents concerning conduct in Vietnam, the Pentagon Papers, to the press.34
These events ballooned into a complex series of scandals, triggering a responsive
succession of Congressional investigations and the creation of the Watergate
Task Force, headed by an independent prosecutor." The investigations resulted in
24. ROSEN, supra note 1, at xvi.
25. Id. at xvii.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at xvii-xviii.
29. Id. at xviii.






2010 /John Mitchell and the Crimes of Watergate Reconsidered
over fifty convictions of individuals and nineteen convictions.of corporations 6
John Mitchell was one of those convicted.37
II. TALL TALES
Perhaps the most revelatory source about Mitchell's life prior to law school
is Mitchell himself, who, as Attorney General, recounted events from his youth.3"
He told a Newsday reporter that he and his brother witnessed a fire burning at a
school near where they lived: "'Whole damned school went."' 39 Recalling this
event, "Mitchell began to chuckle, softly at first, then uncontrollably, until he
was 'half bent' in laughter and brought back into the moment only by a coughing
fit."' This memory prompted another: "'You know I burned down the house in
Blue Point."' 4' According to Mitchell, he lit some sparklers in his possession on a
fourth of July day and accidentally set fire to the porch .42 These twin recollections
would be unremarkable but for the fact that both are false.43 The first was "a
complete fiction" and the second nearly so-only "a couple of the leaves [under
the porch] caught fire."" Other fictions related to athletic prowess.45 Mitchell had
been a good high school athlete, but he was neither the professional golfer he
claimed to have been on The Dick Cavett Show nor a hockey player for the New
York Rangers as cited in his obituary.46 Nor was he the naval war hero that his
lifelong friend, Richard Moore, proclaimed in his eulogy, no doubt relying on
Mitchell as his source:41
"[T]he only thing that most people know about [Mitchell's] war record is
that John F. Kennedy served under him.... I never knew until yesterday
that he received the Navy's treasured award for gallantry in combat-the
Silver Star. Nor did I know that he had been twice wounded, receiving
two purple hearts. 48
36. ROSEN, supra note 1, at xviii-xix.
37. Id. at xix.
38. Id. at 2-9 (recounting stories of Mitchell's early life).
39. Id. at 2
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 2.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7-8 (providing some accounts of Mitchell's claims of athletic prowess).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 14-15.
48. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting the eulogy that Richard Moore delivered).
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In fact, Kennedy did not serve under Mitchell and, according to naval files,
Mitchell was never decorated. 49
Mitchell's motive in telling these whoppers was likely the commonplace one
of impressing others or pleasurably imagining events as he would like them to
have been. But, in hindsight, given Mitchell's multiple convictions for perjury
and his embroilment in factual disputes throughout his career, they seem
portentous. Through numerous Congressional hearings, prosecutorial
investigations, and criminal trials, Mitchell told lies and stuck to them, even
when contrary evidence was indisputable. The most striking illustration relates to
Mitchell's authorization of a cluster of FBI requests for wiretaps to detect
security leaks to the media. ° Four reporters and a dozen government officials
were targeted.5' Although these wiretaps were later determined to be lawful and
were perhaps understood that way at the time, Mitchell resolutely denied
authorizing them.52 Two days after Mitchell's first denial, acting FBI Director
William Ruckelshaus announced at a news conference that records of the
wiretaps had been retrieved from the safe of Presidential Aide John Ehrlichman
and that these records showed that Mitchell had, in fact, personally approved the
requests (and had even erroneously assured then-FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover,
that no such records existed).53 Beyond this, Ruckelshaus personally informed
Mitchell in a letter marked "top secret" that the FBI had discovered fifteen
requests for authorization that Mitchell had approved.! On one request, Mitchell,
in his own handwriting, ordered the tap to be "installed as soon as possible"; on
another, he indicated that the request came from "'a higher authority'"-
presumably a reference to Nixon.5 Nonetheless, Mitchell repeated his denials:
"'A pipe dream,' he told Time in February 1973. "56 A year later, he again denied
to a House of Representatives committee and separately told his trusting deputy,
Richard Kleindienst, that he had not authorized the warrants.57 Beyond these
denials, Mitchell made several others, revealed in previously unpublished,
classified interrogations of Mitchell by Watergate prosecutors and House of
Representatives investigators. In all, Mitchell perjured himself on five separate
occasions by denying his authorization of these warrants. Remarkably, Mitchell's
recklessness and bravado did not result in prosecution.58
49. Id. at 15-16.
50. Id. at 149-51 (providing background information on the wiretapping program).
51. Id. at 150.
52. Id. at 151.
53. Id. at 152.
54. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 152.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 153.
57. Id. at 153-54.
58. Id. at 495.
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III. THE PATH TO RICHARD NIXON
Following graduation from the evening division of Fordham University's
law school, Mitchell married his high school sweetheart, Bette Shine) 9 It was, at
least on Mitchell's part, love at first sight.60 The first time he saw her, he told a
friend, "'That's the woman I'm going to marry.' ' ,6 ' Rosen describes her as "an
entrancing blonde, with a trim, athletic figure ... and a glamorous smile," who
had played basketball for her high school team. 62 They married after Mitchell
graduated from law school and they stayed married for twenty years.63 The
marriage likely experienced strains over time, though Bette viewed their divorce
as something of a mid-life crisis for her middle-aged husband: "'John just walked
in one morning and asked for a divorce." '64 Nonetheless, the divorce was
amicable.6 Mitchell, recalling his promise to take care of her forever, generously
"agreed to pay Bette 35 percent of his gross annual income regardless of whether
she remarried." 66 Eleven days after his divorce, Mitchell married Martha Beall,
about whom more will be said later.67
Mitchell began his professional career at the firm of Caldwell and Raymond,
where he was exposed to the promise of government bonds as a way of financing
public works.68 Bonds could provide a way of exceeding debt ceilings without
69subjecting the issue to a ballot initiative. Mitchell, sensing the power of tax-
exempt bonds to revolutionize public finance, quickly gained recognition as an
expert in the field.7° While traversing the country, Mitchell met politicians and
power brokers and made influential new friends.7 He was, as Business Week
observed, "on a first-name basis with as many elected officials as any full-time
politician in America.""
In December 1966, Mitchell's career took a fateful leap. His law firm, at his
insistence, merged with Richard Nixon's. 73 Thus began a lifelong relationship of
fidelity and travail. "'John Mitchell, personally, wanted to be close to Richard
Nixon,"' one of his new partners recalled.74 "'That was a major motivator in his
59. Id. at 8.
60. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 8.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8, 21 (detailing how the couple met and later describing the divorce and separation).
64. Id. at 20.
65. Id. at 21.
66. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 21.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id.
72. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 27.
73. Id. at 30.
74. Id.
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bringing his firm into this firm."''7 In this, he was successful. Nixon came to
admire Mitchell and to rely on him.76 Mitchell was a self-made man, who
navigated comfortably among the elite with "a bemused blue-collar contempt for
their pretensions."7 He displayed an aura of calm and self-assurance that eluded
Nixon."8 And Mitchell was tough. Their relationship was cemented when Nixon
asked Mitchell to become his campaign manager for his run for the presidency in
1968.79 As one insider, William Safire, stated (or perhaps overstated): "'John
Mitchell was the rock upon which Nixon built his church." 8
Mitchell was, by all accounts, a splendid campaign manager. Nixon gave him
near complete autonomy and Mitchell took charge confidently and effectively.
His achievement was summed up in Business Week: "'[I]t was Mitchell who
provided the administrative hand that made the Nixon machine a textbook
operation. Even under the pressures of the tightening campaign, Mitchell is not
recorded to have ever lost his temper, blamed anyone else for a mistake or even
stalled a decision."'' The Times of London similarly observed, "'It is hard to
imagine that a political campaign was ever run with such crisp, mechanical
efficiency as Nixon's drive on the presidency in 1968. ' ' '12 Mitchell's diligence in
managing this campaign contrasts sharply with his effort the second time around
in 1972. Then, distracted by the Watergate investigations and his wife, Martha's,
breakdown, Mitchell lost focus, delegating some decisions and delaying others
that were his to make. 3
IV. LAW AND ORDER
In his 1968 run for the presidency, Nixon made law and order an
overarching issue' 4 This was a prudent response to elevated public concerns. In
the 1960 presidential campaign, crime was hardly mentioned.85 "A review of the
subject index of the 1960 presidential campaign speeches of John F. Kennedy
and Richard M. Nixon [does] not turn up such words as 'crime,' 'police,' [or]
'law enforcement.' Nor was crime discussed in ... the party platforms of that
year. ,86 "The 1964 presidential campaign signaled the entry of crime as a national
75. Id.
76. See id. at 33.
77. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 33.
78. Id. at 33-34.
79. Id. at 35.
80. Id. at 33.
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id. at 51.
83. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 321-24.
84. Id. at 48.
85. Caplan, supra note 2, at 585.
86. Id.
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issue. 87 Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate, promised that "'as
President, I'm going to do all I can to see that women can go out in the streets of
this country without being scared stiff.""'8 Nixon followed suit four years later to
cheering crowds. 9 Rising crime rates and civil disorder in urban areas nationwide
following the murder of Dr. King created anxiety and prompted calls for
aggressive law enforcement. 90 Nixon shrewdly targeted Lyndon Johnson's
Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, who was preoccupied with civil liberties and
treated crime control advocates as thinly disguised racists. 9' Nixon, to standing
ovations, promised: "'We are going to have a new attorney general of the United
States of America!'
92
Nixon turned to Mitchell to be his tough-on-crime Attorney General. 93
Mitchell was a surprising choice, reflecting Nixon's great confidence. A
municipal bonds practitioner, Mitchell knew little about law enforcement and had
made it abundantly clear that he wished to return to practice in New York.
9
4
There, the eccentric outbursts of his often intoxicated, volatile wife, Martha,
would be less conspicuous. 95 Mitchell resisted Nixon's entreaties. He was, as the
New York Times observed in its obituary, "'not personally ambitious."'
''
Moreover, the role that Nixon envisioned for Mitchell was unattractive. In
person, a genial, warm man with a twinkle in his eye, Mitchell was instrtcted to
adopt a steely, somewhat menacing public persona. Previously unpublished notes
of Nixon's Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, outline the script Nixon had written
for his Attorney General: "play tough SOB role-as crime fighter ... time to go
on real crusade-not just do good . . . put all PR effort we can into this area...
don't make John likable... make him a tough crime-fighter.,
97
Nixon was prescient. Casting personal inclinations aside, Mitchell promptly
stepped into character. He exhibited the same sharp focus and confidence as
Attorney General that he had displayed as campaign manager. At the time
Mitchell assumed office, student demonstrations were at their peak.98 Educators
responded uncertainly to student protests; their mild, even conciliatory responses
to demonstrators who seized their offices invited public unease and scorn. 99 As
with the Administration's war on crime, Nixon insisted that the Department of
87. Id.
88. RICHARD H. ROVERE, THE GOLDWATER CAPER 84 (1965).
89. See ROSEN, supra note 1, at 48.
90. See id. at 44.
91. See, e.g., id. at 48.
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 70-71.
94. Id. at 65-66.
95. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 66.
96. Id. at 487.
97. Id. at 71.
98. Id. at 77.
99. Id. at 77-79.
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Justice appear to be doing something about campus disorder.'m Nixon's focus on
appearances is clear from Haldeman's notes: "'Doesn't matter if we can do
anything.., must say something strong, though ... show no sympathy.' On cue,
[Mitchell] announced a plan to prosecute 'hard-line militants' who crossed state
lines to foment riots on college campuses."'' 1 This was largely political rhetoric,
because maintaining law and order on campuses was not a federal responsibility.
Moreover, the Administration was not as tough as it sounded; it was political and
pragmatic. Mitchell was keenly aware of the dichotomy between words and
deeds, and in an oft-quoted statement made to a group of African-Americans, he
said so publicly: "'You will be better advised to watch what we do instead of
what we say.' '  This was a noteworthy admission, not so much for its duplicity,
as was charged by political opponents, but rather for its demonstration of
strategy. The Administration did not want to undermine its "Southern
[S]trategy' '1°3 to build a Republican base by boasting of its genuine successes in
the South and elsewhere in achieving racial integration, but it continued to pursue
integration aggressively. ° Nixon had a low opinion of African-Americans 15 and
distrusted Jews, but he supported school desegregation and the State of Israel;
Mitchell followed suit. '°6 Nixon's marching orders were to "'just do what is
right,"" 7  and Mitchell followed orders.' 8  Given the Republican Party's
100. Id. at 78.
101. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 78-79.
102. Id. at 489.
103. Id. at 44-47.
104. Id. at 129-30.
105. Mitchell shared Nixon's low opinion of African-Americans. Nixon told his Chief of Staff, H.R.
Haldeman, that welfare reformers did not understand that "the whole problem is really the blacks.... There has
never in history been an adequate black nation, and they are the only race of which this is true." Id. During an
off-the-record meeting, CBS commentator Mike Wallace asked Mitchell if Nixon was going to speak to a group
of black publishers that Hubert Humphrey, Nixon's opponent for the presidency in 1968, had addressed.
Mitchell's response stunned him: "I don't want Dick to go over there. You can buy those monkeys, anyway."
Id. at 126. Mitchell "still use[d] the word 'colored' in his conversation," id. at 127, and occasionally made anti-
Semitic remarks, though not with the frequency and vitriol of his President and presidential aides, Ehrlichman
and Haldeman. A Newsweek reporter recalls Mitchell referring to a New York Times reporter as "the Heb
reporter" and "referring privately to Henry Kissinger as 'that kike."' Id. Nonetheless, on one occasion, Mitchell
accompanied a Jewish supporter of the President to Philadelphia to observe the arrival of a group of Russian
Jews. Mitchell had cleared the way for their emigration from the colossal hardships they endured in the Soviet
Union. As they disembarked, a witness observed Mitchell "crying openly, not bothering to wipe the tears from
his face." Id. at 128. "Israel's ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin-later the state's prime
minister-noted the 'growing... sympathy' for Israel within the Nixon administration, 'especially on the part
of Attorney General John Mitchell."' Id. at 127-28.
106. See ROSEN, supra note 1, at 128-31.
107. Id. at 130.
108. The statistics that Rosen relied upon to demonstrate Mitchell's achievement in desegregating
southern schools through judicial action, see id. at 143 (reporting 6 percent of African-American children in
desegregated classrooms before 1969; 20 percent in the fall of 1969, nine months into Nixon's Administration;
and between 60 and 100 percent by 1970), seem on the high end. The numbers recorded by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights for the period in question, 1968 to 1972, are substantially lower. See U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 61 (Mar. 1975)
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"Southern [S]trategy," neither Nixon nor Mitchell sought recognition for their
achievement.' °9 Years later, one civil rights historian concluded that, "'contrary to
conventional wisdom, contemporary federal affirmative action policy owes far
more to the likes of John Mitchell, George Schultz and Richard Nixon than to
Lyndon Johnson, a fact that stands in sharp contrast to the typical caricatures."'
' ' 0
Mitchell also spoke about the need for standards and goals to upgrade the
administration of criminal justice. He described its administration as "an
astonishing tale of neglect.'"" Mitchell pointed out that "[m]ost states have little
or no basic training for police" and that, "[i]n some states, lower court judges and
prosecutors are not attorneys.""' 2 He reserved his harshest criticism for the prison
system."3 "Most prisons and jails," he asserted, "are overcrowded and
antiquated"; conditions in some places were "'not only deplorable, but in many
cases inhuman."'
' 4
Sometimes Administration rhetoric was so spirited that it alienated those who
might well have been allies. Vice President Spiro Agnew's speeches were
perhaps the most excessive and supercilious. "' Agnew referred to anti-war
activists as "'an effete corps of impudent snobs,""' 6 and Mitchell, who was fond
of Agnew, unrestrainedly followed his lead, labeling some leaders of the New
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam "'more than snobs[,] ...
active militants' eager to 'destroy ... the institutions of government."' ' 7 Mitchell
echoed FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who exaggerated the role of professional
agitators and ignored widespread support for civil rights and criticism against the
war in Vietnam: "'Communists are in the forefront of civil rights, antiwar and
student demonstrations, many of which ultimately become disorderly and erupt
into violence.""'" In fact, most demonstrations were led by responsible,
prominent individuals, peaceful in intent and execution. The New Mobilization
demonstration, for instance, was led by peace leaders such as Senator George
(reporting 18.4 percent school desegregation in 1968 and 46.3 percent (the highest percentage on the chart) in
1972). Nonetheless, there is general agreement that substantial progress was made and that Mitchell's efforts
were praiseworthy. See ROSEN, supra note 1, at 144.
109. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 145.
110. Id. at 144.
111. Ken W. Clawson, Mitchell Calls Criminal Justice an "Astonishing Tale of Neglect," WASH. POST,




115. Prior to his selection as the vice presidential nominee, Agnew had been a corrupt Maryland
governor. He continued to solicit bribes as vice president and eventually wound up as still another Nixon
appointee at the dock. Agnew was allowed to plea nolo contendere in exchange for resigning his office. See,
e.g., United States Senate, Spiro T. Agnew, 39th Vice President (1969-1973), http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/generic/VPSpiro-Agnew.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2009) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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McGovern (the Democratic Party's presidential nominee in 1972), Mrs. Martin
Luther King, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and Yale Chaplain William Sloane Coffin." 9
They did not threaten the populace; they represented it.
There were some exceptions. 12° The four-day May Day demonstrations
sought to shut down the District by blocking bridges to the city and disrupting
traffic.' 2' The fear of looting, however, was never realized. The only incident that
even approached violence involved a demonstrator shoving a stick through the
spokes of a moving police scooter, resulting in a broken leg for the falling
officer. Over 12,000 arrests were made, many of which were preemptive and
therefore of questionable legality,'22 but most demonstrators were not detained for
longer than their first court appearance the next day.'23
V. DiscoRD
Although Mitchell faithfully carried out his President's directive to be the
Administration's no-nonsense, law and order champion, Nixon grew dissatisfied
with his performance. 24 Mitchell was not as cooperative and supportive as Nixon
had hoped. 125 He opposed some of Nixon's pet projects and effectively derailed
others. 12 6 If Nixon understood that saying no to the President is part of the
Attorney General's job description, he nonetheless was resentful. It is probably
true that all presidents at times resent sound legal advice. Both as heads of state
and political leaders, presidents want to make things happen and, at times, see
legal compliance as an obstacle on the course towards needed reform. 12' But
Nixon was different. He brought with him to the Office of the Presidency a
longstanding disdain for the law and a willingness to circumvent it, which he
expected Mitchell to share. '
119. Id. at 88-89, 92-93.
120. Rosen's discussion of the New Mobilization demonstration, November 13-16, 1969, brought one
unrelated, long forgotten event to mind. At day's end, John Dean summoned Chief of Police Jerry Wilson and
me into his office at the Department of Justice to discuss the estimate of crowd size we should release to the
media. Dean argued that only about 250,000 protestors participated; our estimate was much higher, roughly
325,000. This was no small matter since, in negotiating with the demonstrators, we promised an apolitical, good
faith estimate, though we understood that the Nixon Administration wanted a low estimate. Rosen, in passing,
clears the air by noting this entry in the diary of H.R. Haldeman, President Nixon's Chief of Staff: '"Official
estimate 250,000 .... By our photo count, it was 325,000. Anyway, it was really huge."' Id. at 92.
121. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 106-07.
122. Id. at 112.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 162-63.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 163, 180.
127. The tension between law and politics characterizes what little scholarship there is on the Office of
the Attorney General. For a searching analysis, which focuses on the electronic surveillance of Martin Luther
King and other questionable behavior during Robert Kennedy's term as Attorney General, see VICTOR S.
NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971).
128. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 162-63.
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Mitchell deserves more credit for holding his ground than he has received.129
The most tumultuous example is the decision to charge International Telephone
and Telegraph (ITT) with antitrust violations.30 The President's roughneck
Domestic Advisor, John Ehrlichman, had given assurances to ITT on behalf of
the President that the case would not go to trial. 3' Mitchell overrode these
assurances, and, when the trial court decided in favor of ITT, Mitchell, ignoring
Ehrlichman's barbed admonition, allowed the adverse decision to be appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. 32 Nixon, inflamed by this insubordination,
ordered John Ehrlichman to instruct Mitchell's deputy, Richard Kleindienst, to
abandon the appeal to the Supreme Court."'33 Nixon, still hot, called Kleindienst
himself and ordered him to fire Richard McLaren, the head of the Department's
antitrust division. 34 In a recorded conversation between Nixon and Kleindienst,
Nixon ordered "McLaren's ass ... to be out within one hour .... [L]eave the
Goddamned thing alone.... Don't file the brief.... [M]y order is to drop the
Goddamned thing, you son-of-a-bitch! Don't you understand the English
language? Is that clear?"'35 Kleindienst promptly informed Mitchell that he
would resign rather than follow the President's order, and Mitchell met with
Nixon the next day. 36 Mitchell argued that it would be a "'bad political mistake"'
to terminate the legal proceedings and Nixon reluctantly acceded.'37 The
following day, Mitchell told Kleindienst: "'By the way, . . . your friend at the
White House says you can handle your fucking antitrust cases any way you
want.,,,3"
Although routinely coming around to Mitchell's view in their face-to-face
meetings, Nixon was not appreciative. "Mitchell ... didn't want to be
political,"'' 39 Nixon complained. He was particularly upset by the deliberate,
careful way Mitchell was building the case against Daniel Ellsberg for leaking
the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. '4 Nixon ordered him to "[t]ry
[Ellsberg] in the press. Everything, John, that there is on the investigation-get it
out, leak it out. We want to destroy him in the press. Press. Is that clear?"'4 '
129. Erwin Griswold, the former Dean of the Harvard Law School, who continued to serve as Solicitor
General through Nixon's first term, recalled that Mitchell "shielded [him] from several matters ... [and] served
to protect [him] from a good deal of direct pressure" from Nixon appointees. Id. at xv.
130. See generally id. at 186-220 (providing background information on the ITT case).
131. Id. at 189.
132. See id. at 189-99.
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138. Id. at 195. Another example is Mitchell's proceeding with organized crime prosecutions after
Nixon, concerned over alienating the Italian vote, ordered "no mafia prosecutions prior to election." Id. at 49 1.
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On occasion, Mitchell's prudential counsel so annoyed Nixon that he began
to yearn for the time when Mitchell would leave office. Nixon told Haldeman in
a confidential memorandum in 1971: "Actually, when Mitchell leaves as
[A]ttorney [G]eneral, we're going to be better off in my view .... John is just
too damn good a lawyer, you know. He's a good, strong lawyer. It just repels him
to do these horrible things, but they've got to be done."'4' The horrible things to
which Nixon was referring included the formation of the White House Special
Investigations Unit, a secret group better known as "the Plumbers.' ' 143 Nixon,
having been rebuffed by Director Hoover, created the Plumbers to plug leaks to
the media.'" Under the direction of John Ehrlichman, the Plumbers committed a
host of illegal acts, including a break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former
psychiatrist. 145
Mitchell was more successful in his opposition to the infamous "Huston
Plan," another, more ambitious set of proposals for covert domestic actions
advanced by a twenty-eight-year-old White House employee, Tom Huston, who
Rosen describes as "[i]mperious, abrasive, staunchly conservative, and mousy-
an unsmiling executive-branch version of Woody Allen.' ' 46 Huston, agitated by
the FBI's refusal to participate, conspired with disgruntled officials from the CIA
and FBI to develop the Plan.147 He accurately characterized his proposals as
"'clearly illegal"' and "'highly risky,"' but insisted that, if carefully
implemented, they would yield "'the type of intelligence which cannot be
obtained in any other fashion.",14' Nixon did not hesitate. He approved the Plan,
but before it could be acted upon, Mitchell intervened and persuaded the
President to change his position. 49 Mitchell found the Plan "both illegal and
unwise."'5° Looking back, it is ironic that Mitchell, who opposed the White
House covert activities that addressed realistic concerns over national security
breaches, should find himself subsequently ensnared with the criminal schemes
of Gordon Liddy that promoted no public good and whose only purpose was to
subvert the presidential election of 1972.
142. Id. at 76.
143. Id. at 163.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 492-94.
147. Id. at 493.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 493-94.
150. Id. at 493 ("'I quite agreed with them,' Mitchell testified at the Watergate cover-up trial, adding
that the plan 'was not something we in the Justice Department would certainly want to participate in.... It had,
I think, to put it mildly, some illegal activities involved .... I called Mr. Haldeman and the [P]resident and
objected to it."').
2010/John Mitchell and the Crimes of Watergate Reconsidered
VI. BREAKING IN AND COVERING UP
Mitchell's downfall began with a seemingly innocuous meeting with three
subordinates, John Dean, Jeb Magruder, and Gordon Liddy, at Mitchell's office
on January 27, 1972.'"' John Dean had been a Mitchell aide and was then serving
as counsel to the President. Dean valued Liddy's reputation as an intelligence
operative and had recruited Liddy to work for the CRP.52 A former FBI agent
and prosecutor, Liddy maneuvered his way through the Treasury Department to a
White House position. Fit, cocky, and something of a dandy, he passed himself
off as an intelligence expert, although he had never worked for the CIA and had
only worked for the FBI for five years. 53 He was an oddity if only because of his
fascination with the Third Reich.'" While at the White House, he arranged a
"screening of Triumph of the Will, the landmark Nazi propaganda film.' 5  He
was prone to theatrics as well, such as firing a gun in a courtroom, 56 and, on
more than one occasion, proving his fortitude by holding a match under his hand
until the skin was singed.'51
Although Liddy held the title of General Counsel to the CRP, which Mitchell
headed, his actual assignment was to run a well-funded, "'first-class intelligence
151. Id. at 262.
152. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 260.
153. It is easy from a distance to dismiss Liddy as unbalanced or fanatical, but in person he could be
captivating. He was intelligent, engaging, and had a good sense of humor. His shortcoming was judgment; he
mistook the political process for a theatre of war and was obsessive in his need to prove his courage in battle.
See generally G. GORDON LIDDY, WILL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF G. GORDON LIDDY (1980). On more than
one occasion, Liddy offered to murder someone. He once offered the Nixon administration his services in
killing syndicated columnist Jack Anderson. Id. at 207-10. Similarly, he volunteered his services as an assassin
to Egil Krogh, a presidential aide: "'Bud, if you want anyone killed, just let me know.' He smiled and said, 'I
will.' I reacted to his smile by saying, 'I'm serious.' 'I know you are,' said Krogh, his smile gone. 'I'll let you
know."' Id. at 195. Liddy earlier had told Krogh that if he were detected during the break-in at the home of Dr.
Fielding (Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist), he would kill if necessary to avoid apprehension and to protect his
accomplices from arrest. Id. at 169. Liddy's favored method for proving his courage to others was to burn his
palm. On one occasion, Liddy sought to reassure a prospect for undercover work that he could not be forced to
reveal her identity. "She didn't believe me and I was casting about for some way to convince her when I noticed
she smoked. I told her to light her cigarette lighter and hold it out ... and I locked my gaze upon her eyes and
placed my hand, palm down over the flame. Presently the flesh turned black and ... she smelled the scent of
burning meat ..... Id. at 190. Unsurprisingly, the prospect quickly and decisively declined Liddy's offer of
employment. Id. Liddy was untroubled; he had proved his valor. Liddy pulled this stunt so many times that his
palm was "burned out" and he had "to go back to where [he] started years before[, his] forearm," to impress a
fellow inmate. Id. at 298. "The pain," Liddy reported, "was not as severe now because all the nerves in the ...
area had been destroyed." Id. Liddy's poor judgment was evidenced by his enlisting an employee of the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President as one of the burglars in the Watergate break-in, allowing the
investigators to immediately link the burglary to the Republican Party and its campaign manager, John Mitchell.
Liddy accepted responsibility for the botched burglary and earnestly told an astonished John Dean: "'If
someone wants to shoot me... just tell me what comer to stand on and I'll be there, O.K.?' Id. at 257-58.
154. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 260.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 259.
157. LIDDY, supra note 153, at 190.
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operation."""8 Liddy was supposed to report to Jeb Magruder, the Deputy
Director of the CRP. 59 Mitchell had met Liddy several months earlier, in
November 1971, when he approved Liddy's hiring.' 6° They did not discuss covert
intelligence gathering at the November 1971 meeting, but two months later, in
January, they reconvened again in the Office of the Attorney General for a
lengthy briefing by Liddy.' 6' Liddy, carrying an easel and a bundle of charts
(three feet tall and four feet wide), came well-prepared to advocate his
proposals. 
62
Liddy's first proposal, "Operation Diamond," targeted unruly anti-war
radicals to prevent them from interrupting the convention. The prevention
method Liddy had in mind was to "kidnap and drug antiwar leaders and remove
them to Mexico until the convention ended."' 63 Liddy proposed the creation of
"special action groups," a tasteless "reference to Nazi Einsatzgruppen units that
liquidated 1.5 million Jews," to get the job done.' 64
Here, I think it prudent to pause, if only to take a deep breath and ponder
how, if you were in Mitchell's shoes, you might respond to Liddy. Mitchell did
not respond as one might expect, by asking whether his three visitors were out of
their minds. He did not throw the lot of them out of his office. Nor did he treat
Liddy as a crackpot. Rather, he sought particulars. Mitchell asked who would do
the kidnapping. "'[M]embers of organized crime,"' Liddy replied, describing
them as "'professional killers who have accounted between them for twenty-two
dead so far ... including two hanged from a beam in a garage. '"1 65 "'And how
much will their services cost?"' Mitchell asked.' 66 "'Like top professionals
everywhere, sir, they don't come cheap,"' Liddy replied.16 Finally, Mitchell said,
"'[L]et's not contribute any more than we have to the coffers of organized
crime.""1 6' During a break at Mitchell's criminal trial, the presiding judge, John
Sirica, focused on this moment and could not resist commenting to those present:
"'It's too bad that Mr. Mitchell didn't say, "Throw them out of here, get them out
fast," and you wouldn't even be in this courtroom today. It's too bad it didn't
happen that way.""169
Another of Liddy's proposals, "Crystal," involved renting a luxury
houseboat, planting it with bugs and wiretaps, and retaining "sophisticated call
158. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 260.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 262.
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girls" to "seduce and debrief Democratic politicos."'7 Again, Mitchell remained
impassive, listening, but not commenting.'7 ' Other proposals, equally
preposterous, included the "clandestine recruitment of unappealing hippies to
endorse opposition candidates" and retaining "Cuban mercenaries to sabotage the
air-conditioning system at the Democrats' convention."'7 Mitchell did not
approve of Liddy's plans.' Commenting, "'Gordon, that's not quite what I had
in mind,"' he sent Liddy back to the drawing board.'74 Magruder later testified
that Mitchell found Liddy's grand plan unacceptable "'both in its scope and its
budget." 75 The "'type of activity discussed' ... was 'way out of line."",1
76
A week later, Liddy, Dean, and Magruder met again in Mitchell's office at
the Department of Justice to review Liddy's revisions.'7 7 It was their last meeting.
The new agenda was "'less spectacular.",178 Magruder testified that the "'call girl
thing was out, the kidnapping was out.' ' 179 But what remained was still
felonious-burglaries, wiretaps, and theft.'80 The four men also discussed who
should be spied upon, according to Magruder.' 8' Dean initially testified that there
"'may have been something as to potential targets,'' then modified his position,
corroborating Magruder's testimony. 2 Those involved at the meeting were
indeed "'talking about targets, possible targets of electronic surveillance."
' 83
Mitchell denied that prospective targets were discussed and his recollection may
well have been accurate.'" But it is hard to credit fully this denial, given
Mitchell's propensity for denial.
Even if such discussions never took place, it seems clear that, overall, the
issues raised by Liddy's proposals at the two meetings were strategic, not legal or
ethical. The four men, three of whom were lawyers, understood that what was
being proposed was unlawful. Perhaps there was an air of adventure in the room
as they congenially contemplated how their schemes would play out. Nothing
was decided, however. All agree that Mitchell did not approve of Liddy's revised
plan.'85 Liddy's recollection was that the meeting ended with Mitchell "saying he
170. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 263.
171. Id.
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would think about Liddy's proposals and get back to him."'86 Had they known
that Nixon would sweep to re-election by one of the largest landslides in
American history, would they still have criminally conspired to steal the
presidential election? Mitchell later stated, "'I didn't spend a hell of a lot of time
with Liddy .... I left the matter to Dean."-117 But what time Mitchell did spend
with Liddy was too much.
Rosen assiduously tracks the various meetings and communications among
Mitchell, Dean, Magruder, Liddy, and others implicated in the break-in and the
cover-up. He makes two findings, well-supported by parsing the enriched factual
setting he developed, both at variance with prevailing views: first, that John Dean
bears primary responsibility for authorizing the break-in at Democratic
Headquarters at the Watergate office complex;' 8' and, second, that both Dean and
Magruder massaged the facts and shifted blame to Mitchell to secure
prosecutorial leniency. 89 As historians and most investigators have not credited
Mitchell's denials, Rosen's account may well compel a reexamination of their
analyses. Dean, it will be recalled, was the first to sense danger from the
likelihood of criminal prosecution, and he won the race to the prosecutors to
make a deal.' 9° Magruder was not far behind.'9' Magruder's initial testimony only
served to implicate Dean, and, as Dean had already confessed, this was of
marginal value to the Watergate prosecutors, who wanted to know whether
Mitchell was implicated.' 92 Over time, Magruder and Dean revised their
testimonies to say that he was involved. Rosen concludes that Mitchell was "a
casualty of a wicked alliance between coconspirators eager to tell lies and
prosecutors eager to believe them."' 93 It could well have happened that way. This
was Nixon's view. He did not believe that Mitchell gave the order. "'Mitchell,"'
he said, "'is a smart man. He's too smart to ever get involved in a stupid, jackass
thing like Watergate!"1 94 1 agree. "Smart" is the right descriptor. "Scrupulous" or
"principled" would be inapt.
186. Id. at 267.
187. Id. at 261.
188. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 292-95.
189. Id. at 266-67, 298-303 (recounting Magruder's contested account of the events leading up to the
Watergate scandal).
190. Id. at 294.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 294-95.
193. Id. at 298.
194. ROSEN, supra note 1, at 471. Startled by news of the break-in, Nixon struggled, as historians have,
to fix culpability. But he became quite certain that Mitchell did not order or approve the Watergate burglary.
Nixon said: "John wasn't mindin' that store. He was practically out of his mind about Martha in the spring of
1972! He was letting Magruder and all these boys, these kids, these nuts run this thing! The point of the matter
is that if John had been watchin' that store, Watergate would never have happened." Id. at 470. Elsewhere,
Nixon told Robert Mardian, a former Mitchell aide, that he was "sure that the decision was one that Haldeman,
Ehrlichman and JNM were too smart to make." Id. at 446.
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Nixon, nonetheless, ultimately blamed Mitchell. "'We all know who the hell
should have handled this,"' Nixon told Haldeman.' 9 "'Goddamnit, it was
Mitchell, and he wasn't handling it.""' 196 More sympathetically, Nixon noted that
Mitchell's attention was diverted away from the campaign and towards caring for
his wife, who was edging toward a breakdown.'97 "'He was unable to watch the
campaign and as a result, underlings did things without his knowledge."" 9' Nixon
was unable to recognize that his own embrace of unlawful conduct, evidenced,
for example, by his approval of the formation of the Plumbers and of the Huston
Plan, created a climate in which aides would, to court favor with Nixon or have
an adventurous fling, concoct illegal schemes on their own. But he did recognize
that Mitchell was a casualty largely of his own making. Magruder, Dean, and
Liddy, among others, either reported to Mitchell or deferred to him.' 99 Magruder
was his subordinate at the CRP2°° and Dean had been his subordinate at the
Department of Justice 20 ' before moving to the White House. Mitchell may well
have inadvertently led his aides to think that they had the discretion to act in his
stead. As Dean later said, "'John Mitchell is not a terribly responsive
man ... 0 He did not say yes and he did not say no. But he did present himself
as a man who was open to suggestions of wrongdoing. That is why Liddy, Dean,
and Magruder trudged to his office, proposals in hand, for what Mitchell's
prosecutor was to call Liddy's "'one-man crime wave.' '2°3 Rosen emphasizes that
"no court of law ever determined who did give the order,''2° but we all know who
did not prevent what was preventable. 5
That Mitchell was not the same man at the time of Watergate who had
conscientiously and diligently run Nixon's 1968 campaign is evinced by his
oversight of expenditures at the CRP.2° Magruder submitted a payment request
for $83,000 for Gordon Liddy, which both Hugh Sloan, the CRP's Treasurer, and
his boss, Finance Committee Chairman Maurice Stans, declined to process
without first securing Mitchell's approval.2 7 When Mitchell, after admitting that
he did not know what the payment was for, proceeded to approve, Stans was
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taken aback: "'Do you mean, John, that if Magruder tells Sloan to pay these
amounts or any amounts to Gordon Liddy that he should do so?' 'That is right,'
Mitchell answered."208 "'Magruder is in charge of the campaign and he directs the
spending. ''209 But Mitchell, not Magruder, was campaign manager. Perhaps,
ostrich-like, he did not want to know what Liddy and his crew were up to;
perhaps, as Nixon suggested, Mitchell was simply overwhelmed by his wife
Martha's mental and physical collapse, about which more will be said later.20
Unlike the other Watergate defendants, Mitchell expressed no remorse; he
did not consider himself culpable.21' The closest he came to acknowledging guilt
occurred privately to Richard Nixon, shortly after his indictment.2'2 Mitchell said
he was "'terribly chagrined that the activities of anybody attached to his
committee should have been handled in such a manner' and expressed regret he
had 'not policed all the people more effectively in his own organization.'
213
Senator Weicker managed to wrest a concession from him during the hearing of
214the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. Weicker
asked whether "Mitchell, as an officer of the court, felt he had done 'the right
thing' withholding from the authorities his ex post facto knowledge of the
Ellsberg break-in. 'I think, in retrospect [coming forward] probably would have
been the right thing to do,' Mitchell conceded.",215 Finally, Mitchell's petition for
a reduction in his sentence offered a carefully framed admission of sorts.
"'Counsel is authorized by Mr. Mitchell to advise the court that he is truly sorry
for and regrets those actions of his that resulted in his conviction.'
216
Elsewhere, Mitchell denied complicity. He told a former aide that "'[t]he jail
time he spent never bothered him a bit ... except for the fact that. . . he knew he
wasn't guilty.' 2 7 He often stated, vaguely and, characteristically, without
elaboration, "'My mistake was in men, not in law." ''2 8 The statement is hard to
fathom. What mistake about men did Mitchell make? He knew he was keeping
bad company. He knew that the Plumbers were acting outside the law and that
Tom Huston proposed additional criminal undertakings. He also knew that his
aides and those within his ambit of influence, particularly Dean, Magruder, and
208. Id. at 279-80.
209. Id. at 279.
210. See infra notes 223-46 and accompanying text.
211. In contrast, Ehrlichman stated that he had '"abdicated my moral judgments and turned them over to
someone else,"' and Haldeman apologized "'for what I've done, for what I've been responsible for, for what's
been the result of the damage to many, many people, and, I think, to the whole governmental system.... I
recognize my responsibility to atone.' ROSEN, supra note 1, at 460.
212. Id. at 312-13.
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214. Id. at 392-93.
215. Id. at 393.
216. Id. at 459.
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218. Id. at444.
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Liddy, were up to no good. Indeed, they discussed specifics with him. Mitchell
did not rely on them to stay on the right side of the law, but rather to avoid
detection. As to Mitchell's claim that his mistake was "not in law," surely
committing or suborning perjury qualifies as a mistake in law, and Mitchell
perjured himself on more than a few occasions. 29 He was convicted of perjury for
coaching Jeb Magruder to testify falsely before the Watergate Grand Jury. 220 But
Mitchell, lifelong, held his ground: "'There's nothing I did that I wouldn't do
again with a clear conscience.'
22'
Life would surely have gone better for Mitchell if he had, like Ehrlichman,
Haldeman, and other defendants, said he was sorry. He would not have avoided
disbarment, but he would have taken a big step towards rehabilitation and public
forgiveness. But Mitchell, unlike his co-defendants, Dean, Magruder, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, and Liddy, was not about to write a memoir or go on a campus
speaking tour or sell himself in any public forum. Perhaps the most important of
the roads not taken was his decision not to shade his testimony to implicate the
President and thereby gain leniency. However one views this resoluteness, it is
accurate to say, as did Nixon and others, including the Washington Post in the
first edition of its obituary, that Mitchell "'was a stand-up guy.'
222
VII. AND THEN THERE WAS MARTHA
Mitchell's sustained devotion to his second wife, Martha, was as remarkable
as it was inexplicable. He was continuously embarrassed by the unpredictable
behavior of his unbalanced, alcoholic wife, whose late evening and early.
morning crank calls to reporters made her a favorite of the media and a spectacle
to everyone else.223 Some journalists, thrilled by her attacks on Nixon and her
criticism of the war in Vietnam, "cast her as a lonely and brave heroine,"
ignoring palpable evidence of mental illness. 224 "Newsweek crowned her 'the
most liberated woman in the world,' notwithstanding Martha's own declaration
... that she wondered how feminists 'have any respect for themselves.' 25 And
the New York Post saw her "'as the essence of exquisite Southern charm,' 226
despite her habit of ruining social events by shouting down guests, throwing her
shoes at her husband, and passing out.2 27 She once told a Senator: "'It's liberals
like you who are selling this country down the river to the communists.' 22 She
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publicly taunted New York City Mayor John Lindsay, calling him "Lindsley. '229
"'When I don't like somebody,"' she explained, "'I usually have a nickname for
them. '230
Other outbursts, where she addressed sensitive public issues, were more
worrisome. Martha took aim at a landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,13 1 which upheld the constitutionality of
court-ordered busing, by telling reporters that the Supreme Court should be
"'extinguish[ed]'" as "'it's absolutely asinine for those nine old men to rule
against the people. ' '2 32 Her criticism of Nixon, borne of jealousy, remained
immoderate and constant, but her views on the war varied. She made headlines
by saying "'[tihe War Stinks,' ' 233 but celebrated the incursion into Cambodia as
"'100 percent wonderful. ' ' ' 234 Later, we find her "urging friends to send their
draft-age sons to Canada.,
235
Martha's rude outbursts at social events stood in stark contrast to Mitchell's
bearing, which was quiet, reserved, and solicitous. Wherever she went, Martha
demanded attention. John Ehrlichman complained that at dinner parties, "'You
couldn't conduct a separate conversation down at the other end of the table.
She'd say, 'You people down there, be quiet. I want to say something.' ,, 23 6 Her
instability was augmented by her alcoholic binges. Martha drank heavily, passed
out frequently, and was prone to physical violence.237
Nonetheless, Mitchell was devoted to her and worried about her incessantly.
Nixon records a "moving moment" in his memoir.238 When Nixon first learned
that he had won the election and invited Mitchell to join him to get the
presidency "'planned out,"' Mitchell declined. 29 "A tear streamed down his
face... 'I think I'd better go up to be with Martha.' 240 Martha, more than Nixon
or his work, seemed to be the centerpiece of his life.24' Mitchell recognized the
severity of her mental and emotional health problems. He told Haldeman that
Martha might be "unable to cope with the strain of Watergate and expressed
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"very romantic" and said that "it went on for a long time." Id. at 24. Unimaginably, Mitchell was talking "baby
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fear tha shemigh be ... 142fear" that she ight be suicidal. But his options were few. Although Mitchell
continued to publicly maintain a bemused indifference to the behavior of his wife
and privately looked after her as much as one could, the stress he endured as a
target of a criminal investigation forced a change in their relationship. One day
Mitchell abandoned his efforts to manage his wife's madness and walked Out.
243
What followed was a prolonged, nasty, costly, and public divorce,2" followed by
Martha's sudden collapse after contracting a rare and extremely painful form of
cancer.24 ' Her demise was sadder than most. Martha died penniless and alone at
the age of fifty-seven. Mitchell directed the funeral arrangements.2
6
VIII. NIXON AND MITCHELL
Mitchell and Nixon were drawn to one another from their first meetings, at
which they discussed merging their law firms. Nixon admired Mitchell's verve
and confidence and came to perceive him as a valuable ally in making a second
run for the presidency. 247 Mitchell's effectiveness as campaign manager
24
8
cemented this admiration, as did Mitchell's development and execution of a
crime control strategy for the Administration.2 4 ' Their relationship easily survived
a few bad calls by Mitchell, such as his two nominees for appointment to the
Supreme Court, both of whom failed to obtain Senate confirmation. More
annoying to Nixon were Mitchell's objections to his covert intelligence. .. 251
initiatives. Although Nixon more than once wished for an Attorney General
who was more accommodating, he continued to value and admire Mitchell andS• 252
remained close to him.
Martha Mitchell was a thorn in their relationship. Mitchell seemed unable to
stop the continuing stream of front-page stories featuring his batty wife.253 Her
early-morning, alcohol-drenched calls to reporters included outbursts such as "'I
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belongings in the entryway. Mitchell testified that Martha's harassment and instability impaired his preparation
for his criminal trials and that her alcoholic binges rendered her "'unfit' to care for [their daughter], in whom
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love the Democrats' '' 254 and "'I can't get over saying colored."' 5 Following
Senator Fulbright's vote against confirmation of Judge Carswell, Martha called
Fulbright's hometown newspaper and told it, "'I want you to crucify Fulbright
and that's it! ... [He] makes me so damn mad, I can't stand it."' 25 6 Nonetheless,
when Haldeman suggested that Nixon ease Mitchell out of his position as
campaign manager for his re-election, Nixon rejected it out of hand: "'I can't do
that. I won't do that to him. I'd rather, shit, lose the election. I really would.' 257 It
was the break-in at the Watergate that drove the two men apart.
Nixon recognized Mitchell's role in the break-in, justifiably, as several of the
most prominent players were under Mitchell's wing. John Dean had served as his
Associate Attorney General and was working closely with the campaign. 2' Both
Magruder, as Deputy Director of the CRP, and Liddy, as its General Counsel,
reported to Mitchell.2 9 Nixon did not think Mitchell was directly implicated in
the Watergate break-in. "'I think John said, "Well, we're trying to get the
information ... don't tell me anything about it." You know, that's the way you
do it, thinking probably they were going to do it the way you always do, planting
a person on the other side, which everybody does.'"260 Nixon did blame Mitchell
for carelessness in overseeing his staff, but again showed concern for Mitchell's
circumstances. "'I would dump him,"' Nixon told Ehrlichman, "'it would kill
him financially. John Mitchell has a serious problem with his wife. He was
unable to watch the campaign and as a result, underlings did things without his
knowledge.' ' '26' Mitchell, for his part, understood that continuing to serve as
campaign manager might be a burden for Nixon and offered to resign. "'If this
thing escalates,"' he told Haldeman, "'I think it would be very good if I'm out of
the place and you could say, 'Well, there's a whole new team over there.
''2 62
Just as Nixon at times ruminated on how pleasant it might be if Mitchell
resigned as Attorney General, Mitchell at times found Nixon hard to take. He
"derisively referred to Nixon as 'Milhous'-the middle name Nixon loathed,"
and insisted that Nixon lacked intelligence and resolve.263 "Nixon couldn't piss
straight in the shower .... He's about as complicated as my grandson. ' '264 But
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these outbursts, with one exception, were transient, inconsequential, and, of
course, out of public view. The exception was driven by Mitchell's desire to
avoid prosecution. His attorneys sought permission to take Nixon's deposition.
They argued, somewhat opaquely, that "'Mr. Nixon may have participated in a
conspiracy which carefully excluded Mr. Mitchell's membership, and which was
designed to have an extremely adverse effect on Mr. Mitchell's well-being.
''2 65
Apart from this, Mitchell's public remarks invariably manifested great
admiration and respect for Nixon. Unlike many of his fellow Watergate
defendants, Mitchell never attempted to trade information, real or fabricated,
against Nixon in exchange for leniency or to avoid imprisonment. Instead, he
gave the prosecutors an offer they could refuse, a promise to plead guilty if they
ceased their pursuit of the President. Nor did he yield to the temptation of
publishing a memoir or retrospective about his years in power, as did Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Dean, Magruder, Liddy, and others. 266 Nor did Mitchell serve up dirt
about Richard Nixon, of which there was an abundance, in order to delight
university students or television audiences. His was a stoical display of loyalty.
Nixon frequently telephoned Mitchell both during Mitchell's criminal trials
and his imprisonment from June 1977 to January 1979.267 On the Labor Day
weekend following his release, Nixon gave a sixty-sixth birthday party in San
Clemente for his former law partner, campaign manager, Attorney General,
advisor, and friend.2" As Mitchell put it, "'The [P]resident's going to have a
cocktail party for me in San Clemente."' 269 About 250 people attended,270 Nixon
toasted Mitchell, saying, "'John Mitchell has friends ... [a]nd he stands by
them."' 27' Nixon continued to stay close to Mitchell following his release. Mary
Gore Dean, with whom Mitchell lived after the completion of his sentence,
reported that Nixon would call on Mitchell's birthday or if something happened
that he thought would interest Mitchell.272 Henry Kissinger may have been right
in stating that Nixon had no close friends, but Nixon was capable of compassion,
solicitude, guilt, and affection, and he had a deep, abiding affection for John
Mitchell. In his words, "'John Mitchell I love.'
273
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Throughout all the exigencies and perils in which self interest placed them at
odds with one another, their relationship persisted until Mitchell's death in 1988.
At life's end, we find Mitchell walking alone in the late afternoon on
Georgetown streets, "'a gray man plodding alone in his gray way,"' then falling
dead of a heart attack at age seventy-five.274 At Mitchell's funeral, there he was,
the man Mitchell referred to as "the president," prominently escorting Mary Gore
Dean, arm-in-arm, to her seat in the front pew.
IX. LIFE AFTER PRISON
Mitchell served his sentence at the federal prison at Maxwell Air Force
Base. The choice of Maxwell was dictated by concerns over Mitchell's safety
and imposed an added hardship, as Alabama was a long way from his friends and
children in New York and along the East Coast.27' Nonetheless, Mitchell
maintained his sense of humor. When the press asked how he felt, Mitchell
quipped, "'It's nice to be back in Alabama.' 2 76 At Maxwell, he exhibited his
usual bravado, made friends among the inmates, and adjusted to prison life. But
he was a wounded man. "Like Viola in Twelfth Night, he 'sat like Patience on a
monument, / Smiling at Grief,' 2 77 during his nineteen months in custody.
Mitchell did not entirely fade into obscurity following his release, as he
might have liked. Alone among the Watergate defendants, he returned to
Washington. There he reunited with the widow of a long-time friend, Mary Gore
Dean, who had reached out to Mitchell during his criminal trial. "'I just told him
that ... my husband would certainly want me to be his friend if he needed a
friend right now.' 2 78 For Mitchell, she was an angel. He moved into Mary
Dean's large and comfortable townhouse in Georgetown and made his home
there until he died.279 Mrs. Dean's three children came to view Mitchell as a
second father, the youngest calling him "Daddy., 210 "'It was absolutely wonderful
how he brought so much happiness and light into our family,"' said Mary
Dean.28'
But Mitchell struggled to earn a living. Friends had raised several hundred
thousand dollars for him to help cover his legal bills, but most doors were closed
to him when it came to securing employment.2 2 He eventually came into contact
with individuals who sought his intervention with former friends still in high
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places in government. Mitchell did make a few phone calls on their behalves, but,
as it turned out, his most influential contact was Mrs. Dean's oldest daughter,
Deborah. Deborah was the executive assistant to Samuel Pierce, the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), whose two terms in office were
marked by rampant corruption." 3 Her reputation for being the person in the
Secretary's office who could make things happen was well-deserved.284
When Mitchell was approached by an old friend, former Governor of
Kentucky Louis Nunn, for assistance on behalf of a client whose loan increase
request had been denied, he called Deborah Dean.' 8' Four months later, the
decision was reversed and the increase granted. Mitchell was rewarded with a
check for $8,613.94 from Nunn.5 6 Deborah Dean sent Mitchell a copy of the
internal HUD document announcing the favorable decision with "'Daddy.
F.Y.I.' scribbled on it.287 This success bred another. Nunn called Mitchell who
called Dean and a loan was granted. This was a far bigger deal and Nunn sent
Mitchell a check for $75,000.288 Still another call to Deborah Dean by Mitchell
yielded Mitchell $60,000.29
These transactions and many others like them triggered an investigation by
the Inspector General at HUD, which revealed "a five-year pattern wherein
hundreds of millions of dollars.. . were allocated 'on an informal,
undocumented, and discretionary basis.' 290 A subsequent investigation by a
House subcommittee revealed "'rampant abuse, favoritism, and
mismanagement.' 29' The Department of Justice intervened, and Deborah Dean,
283. Id. at 478-79.
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like the man she considered a second father, became a target of a special
prosecutor in a national scandal. Had Mitchell lived, he would likely have joined
her at defendants' table. He was designated "Unindicted Co-conspirator One,"
and Dean was "charged with conspiracy to defraud the government, acceptance
of illegal bribes (in dealings unrelated to Mitchell)," and perjury-thirteen counts
in all.292 Convicted on all counts, she was sentenced to twenty-one months in
jail. 293
X. MITCHELL HIMSELF
I remember Earl Silbert, the first Watergate prosecutor, telling me, as we
walked down M Street in Georgetown, that Mitchell was very well-liked by those
who worked with him. That observation, so contrary to media depictions and
Mitchell's taciturn, aloof bearing, is borne out by Rosen and indeed by everyone
else, including the lead Watergate attorney who prosecuted Mitchell; Mitchell's
comrades in the Navy; his fellow prisoners; his colleagues in the Department of
Justice and in the Committee for the Re-Election of the President; and, for that
matter, me. President Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, a former federal
judge, sympathetically noted that Mitchell's sentence was "'more than [that of] a
bank robber"' and generously granted Mitchell medical furloughs for the
treatment of his hip and for a stomach condition that required surgery, and
granted him leave to visit his family after Christmas. 94 For Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski, receiving the fifty-page indictment of Mitchell from the Grand
Jury was "'a heart-rending moment' . . . . [He] 'had always liked John
Mitchell.' 295 And James Neal, who aggressively prosecuted Mitchell, exhibited a
genuine fondness for him. Two decades after the trial, Neal recalled Mitchell as
"'a thoroughly delightful man.' 296 Mitchell had inscribed Neal's copy of All the
President's Men, a popular account of the events leading to the prosecutions:
"'To one of the nicest guys I know unfortunately cast in the wrong spot at the
wrong time."' 2 97 "'I was convinced,' Neal wrote, 'that [Mitchell's] offenses
emanated not from an evil soul but from a misguided and foolish loyalty to the
president of the United States.' ' 298 Neal took the unusual step of writing to the
Parole Commission in 1978, urging Mitchell's early release (which the
Commission denied). 299 We see affection for Mitchell everywhere, including from
Secretary Carla A. Hills, who received relief from the department for a legal client.
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surprising figures. Even in prison, Mitchell made friends, among others "a
recidivist criminal serving time for transporting stolen merchandise across state
lines."3'0
But Mitchell was not merely likable. He displayed a certain grace under
pressure. He was remarkably able to maintain equanimity, wit, and humor during
his long public ordeal. Following the reading of the jury verdict convicting him
of five felonies, he turned to his downhearted lawyer and said, "'Don't take it so
hard."' 3 ° Then he congratulated the one defendant who was acquitted and
comforted another.m At the sentencing hearing for the defendants in United
States v. Mitchell, when John Ehrlichman's attorney asked the court to permit
Ehrlichman to provide legal services to a tribe of Pueblo Indians in New Mexico
as an alternative to incarceration, Mitchell stage-whispered to his attorney: "'If
they offer us Indians, turn 'em down!"' 33 Exiting the courthouse, Mitchell
quipped: "'It could have been a hell of a lot worse. They could have sentenced
me to spend the rest of my life with Martha."3 °4 After a hippie interrupted his
press conference by calling Mitchell a fascist and U.S. Marshals were dragging
the youth from the room, Mitchell quipped, "'It's all right .... He wasn't on the
jury."'3 5 As Mitchell was leaving the courtroom, a doctor shook his hand. "'If
you ever need a psychiatrist,"' he said, "'I'd be glad to help.' 'If I ever need a
psychiatrist,' Mitchell shot back, 'I'll plead guilty first.'"'3
"'Mitchell was the trial's mystery man,"' Fred Graham commented on CBS
Evening News, "'puffing his pipe, cracking occasional jokes, refusing to attack
Richard Nixon . . . ."0' Nixon commented in his now famous interviews with
David Frost that Mitchell "'never lets his emotions show. Except he does have a
quiver in his hand at times . ,,,"0' Nixon probably knew better. In private,
Mitchell acted like a man under extreme stress. During the later stages of
Watergate, he drank heavily, and his close friend, Fred LaRue, who dined with
him every night, sometimes put him to bed.3°9 LaRue worried that Mitchell would
crack under the strain of prosecutions and perhaps commit suicide. 3'0 Everything
was going wrong. Mitchell foresaw his future-prison, disbarment, and
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ostracism. But Nixon was right in noting that Mitchell had great resilience and
fortitude and that he was loyal-to a fault, one might add.
XI. CONCLUSION
Rosen has lifted the veil on the events of Watergate. Drawing on fresh
sources and providing a penetrating analysis of events, his conclusion that it was
not Mitchell who approved the break-in at Watergate deserves respect and may
well trigger a rethinking of Watergate by historians. But as rich as his research is,
it still leaves Mitchell an enigmatic figure. We don't understand how someone as
smart and seasoned as Mitchell would wind up disgraced. The stock explanations
do not run deep. Rosen reports that they "split along a clear fault line. There were
those who believed Mitchell's great mistake was marrying Martha Mitchell and
those who believed it was allying himself with Richard Nixon."3 ' Martha was the
leading proponent of the "blame-the-president" position and Nixon returned the
favor, as noted earlier, by laying Mitchell's misfortune largely at her feet.3 2 Both
have a point. I fall more in the "blame-Nixon" camp.
Nixon cast a long, dark shadow enveloping his top aides. They were
subjected to unceasing diatribes against his political opponents and the press.
Nixon saw himself surrounded by enemies. He told Henry Kissinger: "The press
is the enemy. The establishment is the enemy. The professors are the enemy,"
Nixon told Kissinger in a recorded Oval Office conversation on December 14,
1972.' 13 Nixon was a damaged man, angry, suspicious, vindictive, and
overflowing with resentment over perceived and real mistreatment. He retailed
his beleaguerment, his bunker mentality, to those around him, and they exhibited
a remarkable capacity for adopting this skewed perspective, sharing Nixon's
disdain for the law and for playing by the rules. In this atmosphere, it is
unsurprising that along the way excesses would occur and poor judgment would
be exercised. The President set the table and others, lacking judgment and
inhibition, took seats.
Even though the White House tapes reveal that Nixon was unaware of
Liddy's proposals and was stunned to learn of the break-in at the Democratic
Headquarters, it is hard to imagine Watergate occurring in any other president's
term. It may be an overstatement to say, as Samuel Johnson did, that "virtue is
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uncommon in all the classes of humanity, ''1  but Nixon's cluster of advisors
seemed uncommonly willing to break the law. Mitchell's makeup made him less
susceptible to Nixon's world view, but he was not immune. Becalmed, Nixon
could be thoughtful, shrewd, and, with an eye to posterity, high-minded. At these
times, Nixon welcomed Mitchell's cautionary counsel. But Nixon's moments of
tranquility were momentary. Like a sponge, he reverted to his original
fixations,3 5 which enveloped malleable, ambitious men like Dean and Magruder,
extremists like Liddy, key advisors such as Ehrlichman and Haldeman, and, to a
lesser, but more costly degree, John Mitchell.3 6 When the Watergate investigators
finally got their hands on Mitchell, he hunkered down and obdurately buried
himself in a sea of denials, half-truths, and hair-splitting.
If Mitchell could have divorced his wife a few years earlier and been free to
focus on his governmental obligations, if he could have turned down his
appointment as Attorney General, or if he could have gracefully resigned once he
learned of the White House shenanigans, undertakings that the FBI and CIA
declined to perform, would it have served him well? If so, then one has to ask
whether he was capable of taking such actions. Again, it would seem so. But
perhaps this is just rear-view-mirror speculation. What does come through clearly
about John Mitchell is that he was not dour and stem or unfeeling, as his public
persona suggested. He was a thoughtful, caring, affable, humorous, witty
companion, well-liked by prisoners and his prosecutors, generous to a fault to
both of his wives, and devoted to the people with whom he worked and who
worked for him. He was somebody special, a dear man in many ways. But the
attractive qualities he exhibited-intelligence, perceptiveness, and balance-
were not consistently manifested in his public life.
Rosen closes the book on Mitchell's life with an anecdote in which a friend,
over lunch one day, inquired of him, "If you had it to do all over again, what
would you do differently?"3 ' Mitchell responded by recalling an unannounced
office visit in 1960 from a man named Bobby Kennedy. Kennedy, Mitchell
claimed, was seeking Mitchell's assistance to run his brother, Jack's, presidential
campaign. Mitchell declined, and when Kennedy persisted, Mitchell reports
throwing him out of his office. "'If I had it all over to do,' Mitchell said with a
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smile, 'I'd run Jack Kennedy's campaign." ''318 Rosen swallows this story whole,
wistfully treating it as something that might have been. More likely, it was
another tall tale, but unlike those of battlefield and sports heroics, perhaps it is
one to be treated gently, a reminder of sorts by a man long suffering and
disgraced: "Remember me. I was once somebody."
I saw Mitchell one more time. It was after he had been released from
Maxwell. He was sitting in the back booth of a Georgetown restaurant, The
Guards, with Mary Gore Dean, and I was with a friend who was at the
Department of Justice when Mitchell was Attorney General. My friend walked
over to pay his respects and I joined him after a moment. Mitchell was cordial
and gracious in his reserved way and we chatted briefly. I have no recollection of
what pleasantries we exchanged, and I have no regrets over paying my respects.
Much about John Mitchell warrants respect. His congratulatory letter is back on
my office wall. I know that there is a case for taking it down; but there's no
arguing with feelings, and, as of this writing, there it is.
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